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I. INTRODUCTION 
Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are currently being developed for 
therapeutic and recreational purposes and are expected to be widely used in 
the next two decades. Legal scholars have recently begun considering the 
ethical and legal implications of future use of BCIs. Some point out the 
peculiarities BCIs entail. Most notable is the fact that BCI-technology 
enables its users to affect the world using devices such as robotic arms, 
prosthesis, or other machines, while the execution of commands in such 
devices runs through computers directed by brain signals which, in contrast 
to usual forms of actions, does not involve bodily movement at all.1 Others 
call for recognizing new human rights in the age of neurotechnology to 
protect the mind, the last refuge of individual freedom and self-
 
1 Steffen Steinert et al., Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer 
Interfaces and Disembodied Agency, 32 PHIL. & TECH. 457–82 (2019). 
2021] Neurolaw: Brain-Computer Interfaces 329 
 
  
determination, from governments and companies gaining unprecedented 
access to components of mental information and abusing BCI-technology to 
influence individuals’ capacity to govern their behavior freely.2 However, 
given the early stage of these emerging technologies’ development, the legal 
literature on this matter remains sparse. Scholars have yet to propose a 
concrete regulatory model that ensures the integrity of BCI-technology and 
protects users from unknown external manipulations. Without adequate 
safeguards, access to the neural processes that underlie conscious thought 
risks profound violation of individual privacy with the potential to subvert 
free will; personal identity, agency, and moral responsibility may be 
diminished. Such outcomes could change the nature of human societies and 
humanity. 
This conference paper will cover the legal implications of BCIs and 
present examples of normative inconsistencies concerning the use of BCIs. 
This paper will explore the change BCI-technology can bring to human 
society’s nature, address BCIs from the perspective of law, policy, and public 
interest, and advocate for a comprehensive reform of neuro-rights.  
A. What Are Brain-Computer Interfaces?  
BCIs are systems that translate the brain’s electrical activity into 
signals controlling external displays and devices, such as cursors on 
computer screens, Internet browsers, robotic arms, switches, or prosthetic 
limbs. 
BCIs are devices that can read brain signals and convert them into 
control and communication signals. These are artificial systems that bypass 
the body’s efferent pathways (normal neuromuscular output channels); 
instead of using peripheral nerves and muscles, BCIs directly measure brain 
activity then translate and record it into matching control signals for BCI 
applications in a translation procedure that includes signal processing and 
pattern recognition done by a computer.3  
 
2 Marcello Ienca & Roberto Andorno, Towards New Human Rights in the Age 
of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology, 13 LIFE  SCI., SOC’Y & POL’Y (2017); Rafael 
Yuste & Sara Goering, Four ethical priorities for neurotechnologies and AI, 551 
NATURE 159 (2017).  
3 BERNHARD GRAIMANN, BRENDAN ALLISON & GERT PFURTSCHELLER, Brain-
Computer Interfaces: A Gentle Introduction, in BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES: 
REVOLUTIONIZING HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 1–28, 1–4 (Bernhard 
Graimann, Brendan Allison, & Gert Pfurtscheller eds., 2010). 
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The first BCI was introduced in 1964 when Dr. Grey Walter 
surgically implanted electrodes in the motor areas of a patient’s brain and 
connected them to a slide projector. Dr. Grey asked the patient to press a 
button to move forward slides at his own free decision (boredom, curiosity, 
or otherwise), but what advanced the slides was the amplified signal from the 
electrodes implanted in the patient’s motor cortex.4 That was the first time 
that control of an external device without movement was achieved. Since 
then, BCI research has focused on therapeutic purposes - developing control 
and communication systems for people suffering from severe medical 
conditions such as complete paralysis or locked-in syndrome - to provide 
users with essential assistive devices. With the advances in BCI technology, 
it has become appealing to users with less severe disabilities and offers new 
means of treating stroke, autism, and other disorders. 
What is more, BCIs have become appealing to healthy individuals as 
well for enhancement purposes. At Neuralink’s launch event, Elon Musk 
stated his venture’s objectives are to understand and treat brain disorders, 
preserve and enhance healthy brains, and create a well-aligned future.5 The 
Royal Society assesses that by 2040 neural interfaces for therapeutic 
purposes will evolve and expand.6   
The current medical research has shown that you can read neurons 
in human brains, which is an essential proof of concept that this could be 
done. But, current BCIs are attached to big wires and boxes that come out of 
the patient’s head, which may cause a risk of infection, and they are not 
comfortable.  
Tech companies are working against the clock to develop this 
technology for both therapeutic and recreational purposes. Facebook has 
invested about 500 million dollars in a company that connects the brain to 
computers using non-invasive technology.7 Elon Musk invested 100 million 
dollars from his personal capital in the Neuralink venture that develops 
 
4 DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 167 (1991). 
5 Neuralink, Neuralink Launch Event, YOUTUBE (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-vbh3t7WVI. 
6 ROYAL SOCIETY, IHUMAN: BLURRING LINES BETWEEN MIND AND MACHINE 
58-61 (2019), https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/ihuman/report-neural-
interfaces.pdf. 
7 Charlotte Jee, Facebook Is Buying a Startup That Makes a Wristband To 
Control Computers With A Twitch, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/09/24/132908/facebook-is-buying-a-
brain-machine-interface-startup-to-further-its-ambitions-in-the-field/. 
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invasive BCIs aimed at helping patients with paralysis or amputated limbs 
regain the ability to communicate with their environment. He has not hidden 
that the ultimate goal is to connect us directly to machines to improve 
ourselves with artificial intelligence.8 Twenty years from now, the estimates 
are that the use of BCIs for therapeutic purposes will evolve and expand and 
that BCIs for enhancement purposes will become widely used for gaming, 
fitness, and well-being. When put into practice, this technology is expected 
to bring about some inconsistencies to the legal system as we know it.  
B. Categorization of BCIs 
There are three categories for operating BCIs: active, reactive, and 
passive BCIs.9  
Active BCIs – Active BCIs derive outputs from consciously 
controlled brain activity independent of external events.10 In active BCIs, the 
user intentionally performs mental tasks that create a particular brain activity 
pattern, which the BCI system detects.11 One common mental strategy is 
motor imagery. In this technique, the user imagines moving parts of her body 
– typically a hand, foot, and the tongue, for their comparatively large and 
topographically different motor and somatosensory cortex areas – without 
actually moving them. The patterns produced by the motor imagery are 
similar to the patterns elicited by actual movements and are directly 
connected to the normal neuromuscular output pathways. For example, some 
BCIs can detect if the user is imagining moving her left hand, right hand, or 
feet, allowing three signals to be mapped as commands for the BCI to 
perform, such as to move left, right, and select.12 Moreover, Aflalo et al. 
implanted two microelectrodes in the posterior parietal cortex of a tetraplegic 
patient and asked them to perform motor imagery. The researchers were able 
to read out the intentions of action planning from the posterior parietal cortex, 
where the motor intentions are formed before their transmission to the motor 
 
8 Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk’s Brain-Computer Interface Company 
Neuralink Has Money And Buzz, But Hurdles Too, CNBC (Dec. 5, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/05/elon-musks-neuralink-bold-ideas-hurdles.html. 
9 Thorsten O. Zander et al., Enhancing Human-Computer Interaction with Input 
from Active and Passive Brain-Computer Interfaces, in BRAIN-COMPUTER 
INTERFACES 181–99 (Desney S. Tan & Anton Nijholt eds., 2010). 
10 Id. 
11 Steinert et al., supra note 1. 
12 GRAIMANN, ALLISON & PFURTSCHELLER, supra note 3, at 11–13. 
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cortex. The reading was used to control external devices, including a robotic 
limb and a cursor.13 
Reactive BCIs – Reactive BCIs derive outputs from brain activity 
arising in reaction to external stimuli, which is indirectly modulated by the 
user for controlling an application.14 A commonly used paradigm is P300-
based selection. A P300 wave is an event-related potential (ERP) component 
produced when the brain detects stimuli that deserve a person’s attention. It 
is a neural signature of the form of positive (P) deflection in the EEG about 
300 milliseconds after the onset of the stimuli (hence P300).15 In P300-based 
selection BCIs, a sequence of stimuli, e.g., letters, are presented before a user, 
and she has to focus her attention on the letter she wishes to choose. The BCI 
system detects a P300 signal in response to her selection, indicating her 
selected letter.16 This brain signal is used for different BCI applications: 
P300-based BCI systems are optimal for spelling characters with high speed 
and accuracy (compared to other BCI strategies such as motor imagery);17 
they have shown success in operating environmental control systems; 18  they 
have been implemented for controlling Internet browsing;19 they enable 
creative expression by facilitating brain-painting.20 
Passive BCIs – Passive BCIs are systems that derive their output 
from arbitrary brain activity without the purpose of voluntary control for 
enriching human-computer interaction with implicit information.21 Passive 
 
13 Tyson Aflalo et al., Decoding Motor Imagery from the Posterior Parietal 
Cortex of a Tetraplegic Human, 348 SCI. 906–10 (2015). 
14  Swartz Center for Computational Neuroscience, UCSD, Thorsten Zander: 
Passive and Reactive BCI, YOUTUBE (Mar. 27, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6LeiWshbaNM. 
15 John Polich, Updating P300: An Integrative Theory of P3a and P3b, 118 
CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 2128–48 (2007). 
16 Steinert et al., supra note 1. 
17 Christoph Guger et al., How Many People are Able to Control a P300-Based 
Brain–Computer Interface (BCI)?, 462 NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 94–8 (2009). 
18 Yoji Okahara et al., Operation of a P300-Based Brain-Computer Interface by 
Patients with Spinocerebellar Ataxia, 2 CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY PRACTICE 
147–53 (2017). 
19 José L. Sirvent et al., P300-Based Brain-Computer Interface for Internet 
Browsing, in 71 TRENDS IN PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT 
SYSTEMS 615–22 (Yves Demazeau et al. eds., 2010). 
20 Jana I. Münßinger et al., Brain Painting: First Evaluation of a New Brain–
Computer Interface Application with ALS-Patients and Healthy Volunteers, 4 
FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE (2010). 
21 Zander et al., supra note 9. 
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BCIs monitor a user’s brain activity without needing her to carry out mental 
tasks,22 allowing real-time analysis of bio-signals aimed at quantifying 
insights such as mental and emotional states. 23  Predating passive BCIs have 
been proposed for detecting forms of mental workload,24 and perception of 
self-induced errors.25 Current trends include applying passive BCI for 
driving, aviation, training, and expertise assessment in operative 
environments such as hospitals and public transport, team resources 
evaluation where the success of the task is based on the ability to do effective 
teamwork, a commercial application like gaming and neuromarketing.26 
C. What the Future Holds 
In healthcare, BCIs demonstrate remarkable potential to help people 
replace or restore functions that have been compromised by illness or injury. 
The most immediate target for clinical BCI research is the locked-in 
syndrome and advanced ALS patients to whom BCIs are expected to restore 
basic communication. Other diseases and injuries interfere with mobility. 
Some conditions — such as cervical spinal-cord injury, brain-stem stroke, 
ALS, and other motor neuron diseases: Guillain-Barrè syndrome, 
neurofibromatosis, multiple sclerosis, spastic tetraplegia, and “watershed” 
distribution bilateral strokes — can even result in tetraplegia, which makes 
restoration of mobility another primary goal of BCI research, even in small 
amounts such as hand grasp. Mobility is also a priority for people with 
paraplegia, most commonly caused by injury to the spinal cord. However, it 
could also result from thoracic/lumbar/sacral spinal-cord injuries, post-polio 
syndrome, multiple sclerosis, neurofibromatosis, artery of Adamkiewicz 
ischemia, spastic diplegia, some types of muscular dystrophy, and bilateral 
anterior cerebral artery vasospasm. Also, amputation of one or more limbs 
due to trauma, vascular disease, or for therapeutic purposes in cases of 
cancers or infections is another cause of decreased ability to move where 
BCIs might help restore mobility by providing control of powered 
 
22 Steinert et al., supra note 1. 
23 P Aricò et al., Passive BCI Beyond the Lab: Current Trends and Future 
Directions, 39 PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 08TR02 (2018). 
24 Guido Dornhege et al., Improving Human Performance through Real-Time 
Mental Workload Detection, in TOWARD BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACING 409-22 
(2007). 
25 Benjamin Blankertz et al., Single Trial Detection of EEG Error Potentials: A 
Tool for Increasing BCI Transmission Rates, in 2415 ARTIFICIAL NEURAL 
NETWORKS — ICANN 2002 1137–43 (José R. Dorronsoro ed., 2002). 
26 Aricò et al., supra note 23. 
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wheelchairs, hand orthoses, robotic arms, or powered exoskeletons. Loss of 
autonomic functions (e.g., bladder and bowel control, sexual function, 
regulation of heart rate, blood pressure, and body temperature) can 
significantly impact an individual’s health, potentially mediated by BCIs. 
Because autonomic functions are in large part neurally based, BCI 
technology can contribute to their restoration. Also, BCIs can help 
supplement standard therapies to improve functional outcomes in stroke 
rehabilitation and help manage other neurological or psychiatric illnesses, 
e.g., epilepsy and other cognitive and mood disorders.  
BCIs have a range of other possible uses in addition to serving as 
assistive technology for rehabilitation and other therapeutic purposes. For the 
general population, non-medical BCI uses fall into three categories. First, 
BCI systems might be used to optimize performance in conventional 
neuromuscular tasks. Meaning, the devices might intervene when attention 
reduces or modify workload when it gets to a level that is likely to result in 
diminished performance and errors. Second, BCI systems might be used to 
enhance neuromuscular performance beyond that possible conventionally. 
For example, BCI detection of EEG features specific to target stimuli might 
increase speed and accuracy in a detection task, BCI recognition of EEG 
premovement potentials might enable shorter reaction time, or BCI error 
detection might allow the canceling or correction of mistake. Third, BCIs 
will enable the creation of systems that broaden or enrich life experience 
through media-related activities (e.g., internet access), new methods of 
artistic expression, or appealing new computer games that engage the interest 
of numerous people regardless of disability.  
It is commonly known that technology advances faster than the law 
– the “pacing problem” – and that today’s legal practice may prove futile 
when applied to tomorrow’s legal challenges. For example, the internet was 
initially designed as a research project when security and privacy issues were 
not a critical concern. However, with the expansion of the internet, we now 
face legal cases dealing with these matters daily without having prepared 
solid groundwork, and we adapt regulations “on-the-go.” The most 
prominent current example that illustrates the “pacing problem” is tech-
giants now facing antitrust hearings in front of the American Congress 
concerning their market dominance, as well as the movie The Social 
Dilemma27 that reveals the dangerous impact of social media networks on 
 
27 THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Netflix release, Sept. 9, 2020).  
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human society.  Hence, it is crucial to get ahead of the use of BCIs and design 
legal doctrines to accommodate the legal implications of these innovations. 
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. BCI-Mediated Action 
In the field of criminal law, a BCI-mediated action performed by a 
brain-controlled prosthetic limb does not satisfy the criminal law’s 
fundamental requirements of actus reus and mens rea. The principle of 
conduct – the actus reus – requires that a criminal act, or an unlawful 
omission of an act, must have occurred; a person cannot be held liable for 
just thinking criminal thoughts. It is customary to understand the ‘act’ as a 
person’s bodily movement contributing to the offense's occurrence. 
However, the use of BCIs is problematic for criminal law as the traditional 
doctrine of understanding the act requirement as a bodily movement is not 
compatible with BCI-mediated actions. 
A conventional action differs from BCI-mediated action. In 
conventional action, the bodily and muscle movements constitute the action, 
whereas, in BCI-mediated action, it is a mental act that triggers and controls 
a device by realizing neural correlates of thought activity. The outcomes in 
the world are results of devices such as robotic arms, prostheses, or other 
machines, operated through a computer and directed by brain signals. Thus, 
a BCI-mediated action does not satisfy the law’s ‘action’ requirement, which 
includes willed bodily movement; this creates a gap and serves as a basis for 
updating legal definitions.28 
BCIs allow users to control devices without moving their bodies. The 
users imagine certain things, and the BCIs read the neural activity and operate 
the output device accordingly. Users who affect the world using BCIs do not 
perform any conduct, so when they commit crimes using BCIs, it is unclear 
how they have satisfied the actus reus. But imposing differential criminal 
liability on people based on how they committed the violation – whether by 
a bodily movement or by a BCI-mediated action – would be unfair. So, it 
seems that BCI-mediated actions should be qualified to satisfy the ‘act’ 
requirement – the question is: how? 
The most intuitive and plausible way of remedying this gap would 
be to qualify a BCI-mediated action as a bodily movement. We can do that 
 
28 Stephen Rainey, Hannah Maslen & Julian Savulescu, When Thinking is 
Doing: Responsibility for BCI-Mediated Action, 11 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 46–58 
(2020); Steinert et al., supra note 1.  
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by recognizing neural activity as an indicator of movements. The factual 
basis of the offense is perceived as an objective dimension that comprises all 
physical components of the offense in the tangible world. The core of the 
‘act’ is a bodily movement that is currently understood as muscle activation. 
However, the physiological system allows motion – the musculoskeletal 
system – to move on commands from the brain in the form of neurons firing 
electrical pulses. Until now, muscles have been the sole executors of brain 
commands and the only observable and measurable markers for their 
occurrence. With BCIs bypassing the body’s biological muscular output 
channels, they may allow a new array of outputs to affect the world. 
However, they still rely on electrical pulses to initiate intentional movement. 
One way of solving this problem would be to shift focus from where the 
action ends to where it begins. 
Recognizing neural activity as an indicator of movements will satisfy 
the factual basis of the offense. The core of the ‘act’ is a bodily movement 
currently understood as muscle activation. Until now, muscles have been 
both the sole executors of brain commands as well as the sole observable and 
measurable markers for the occurrence of such executions of brain 
commands. With BCIs bypassing the body’s biological muscular output 
channels, they allow a new array of outputs to affect the world. Nevertheless, 
they still rely on electrical pulses to initiate movement. These electrical 
pulses are objective and physical measures indicating the initiation of the 
brain commands’ execution process that could be measured by objective 
external means in accordance with the factual basis of the offense.  
Two things are important to emphasize with this regard: First, as 
Kramer Thompson notes, not every brain activity is an act, similar to not 
every bodily activity being an act/action. For example, neural activity 
responsible for maintaining the body’s homeostasis is not an act rather an 
activity.29, 30 Second, qualifying brain acts to satisfy the ‘act’ requirement 
does not entail criminalizing thoughts. For a consequential offense to occur, 
there must be a causal relationship between the act and the outcome in the 
world stipulated in the offense. Causation has a two-prong test: factual and 
legal. Factual causation means that the offender’s act constitutes an essential 
 
29 Kramer Thompson, Committing Crimes with BCIs: How Brain-Computer 
Interface Users Can Satisfy Actus Reus and be Criminally Responsible, 
NEUROETHICS (2019)  
30 Rainey, Maslen, & Savulescu, supra note 29. 
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link in the chain of events that produced the end result and is determined by 
the NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set) and the “but-for” tests.  
Scholars have expressed concerns that if the act is satisfiable by 
neural activity, a user’s action may satisfy the act requirement before she is 
aware of performing it or even having the intention to perform it.31 While a 
valid argument, this criticism is not different from the criticism of the Libet 
experiment on free will, which had previously established that decisions are 
unconsciously made in the brain and only later made it into consciousness 
once the decision signal had become strong enough.32 The question of 
whether we have free will is a profound question at the very heart of the 
foundations of the criminal system. The author of this paper strongly believes 
that these foundations are in need of a reconsideration in light of recent 
discoveries in neuroscience and epigenetics; however, this reconsideration is 
beyond the scope of this conference paper as it will only focus on BCIs.    
Having said that, some scholars have expressed concerns that if the 
act is satisfiable by neural activity, a user’s action may satisfy the act 
requirement before she is aware of performing it or even having the intention 
to perform it. While this is a valid argument, the criticism is not different 
from the criticism that the Libet experiment raised on the notion of free will. 
33 These experiments had previously established that even with conventional 
acts, decisions are unconsciously made in the brain and only later make it 
into consciousness once the decision signal had become strong enough. The 
question of whether we have free will is not unique to BCIs. Rather, it’s a 
profound question at the very heart of criminal law. This topic is beyond the 
scope of this short conference; however, it is covered extensively in Professor 
Sapolsky’s book Behave.34  
BCI-mediated action involves a lesser degree of control over the 
actions they mediate. Recalling that BCIs are classified into three types: 
active BCIs that derive outputs from consciously controlled brain activity 
independent of external events; passive BCIs that derive their outputs from 
random brain activity without voluntary control activation; and reactive BCIs 
that derive outputs from brain activity arising in reaction to external stimuli.35 
 
31 Thompson, supra note 31. 
32 Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious 
Will in Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 529–39 (1985). 
33 Id. 
34 ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE (2017). 
35 Zander et al., supra note 9. 
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Another problem in criminal law arises from the voluntary act 
requirement. This legal principle requires all criminal acts to be voluntary 
and entail an alternative to act differently, by way of action or abstention.36 
Imposition of liability under circumstances where the person had no 
possibility to act otherwise undermines criminal justice’s purposes such as 
deterrence and directing behavior, and the principles of conduct and guilt.  
Another problem that arises from BCI-mediated action is with the 
mens rea. BCIs can affect a user’s sense of agency, particularly unique cases 
that arise in the combination of BCIs and Intelligent Devices (IDs). Providing 
devices with artificial intelligence can significantly enhance the performance 
of BCIs and is valuable for the rehabilitation and daily life support of disabled 
people. However, confusion may arise when the behavioral control shifts 
from the user to the ID, which can affect the experience of the person as 
generating the action and may either decrease or increase a user’s sense of 
agency and thus her responsibility for the actions.37 To emphasize the 
separation of action from the experience of will, Wegner distinguishes 
between doing without feeling and feeling without doing. 38 However, free 
will entails an ability to act in a different manner.39 Since with BCIs, we have 
to think in terms of “go-commands” for specific movements – they lack a 
veto control.40 A human agent embedded with a BCI-ID system can, by 
merely thinking about a specific action, cause the robot to carry it out without 
being able to block the consequences. This principle, to which Metzinger 
refers to as the principle of veto-autonomy, causes the distinction between 
volition and action to become blurred, and it raises questions regarding when 
should we hold a human agent legally culpable? 41 The extent to which one 
has free will to control her actions determines criminal responsibility, and if 
one’s ability to control her actions is diminished – so should her culpability 
be. 
 
36 Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1st ed., 2012). 
37 Pim Haselager, Did I Do That? Brain–Computer Interfacing and the Sense of 
Agency, 23 MINDS & MACHINES 405–18 (2013). 
38 DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 8–9 (2002). 
39 Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON. SERIES 
B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 1775–85 (2004). 
40 Rainey, Maslen & Savulescu, supra note 29. 
41 Thomas Metzinger, Two Principles for Robot Ethics, in ROBOTIK UND 
GESETZGEBUNG 40, 40 (2013). 




The term brain hacking describes the emerging possibility of 
malicious actors accessing BCIs and other neural devices to compromise the 
operations of these devices, similar to how computers are hacked. In 
computer science, the model designed to guide information security policies 
is the CIA triad – Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. A hacker 
should not be able to penetrate a device to obtain private information 
(confidentiality); a hacker should not be able to interfere with the device’s 
settings (integrity); a hacker should not be able to deny access to the device 
from its authorized users (availability). In particular, Denning et al. define 
the term “neurosecurity” as the protection of the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of neural devices from malicious parties, and they give 
examples for attacks against BCIs that might compromise the three tenets of 
cybersecurity. These include the wireless hijacking of a prosthetic limb, the 
malicious programming of neurostimulation therapy, and the eavesdropping 
of a brain implant’s signals to reveal private information.42 Li et al. survey 
possible security scenarios and potential attacks against BCIs and classify 
them into four categories based on their usage: (i) neuro medical applications 
– where they reiterate the example of hijacking a prosthetic limb; (ii) user 
authentication – in authentication systems that verify individuals by their 
EEG signals, in which scenario a hacker can attack the authentication system 
using a synthetic EEG signal; (iii) gaming and entertainment – rely on 
standard Application Programming Interfaces (API) to access BCIs that 
provide unrestricted access to raw EEG signals for BCI games; (iv) 
smartphone-based applications – that are prone to attacks that originate in the 
mobile device itself.43 What is more, in addition to the direct harm that results 
from the attack against the information technology system in its conventional 
form (the CIA triad), attacks against the human brain (and mind) can lead to 
indirect harm with profound ethical and legal implications. Ienca and 
Haselager emphasize that misusing neural devices for malicious purposes 
may not only threaten users’ physical security, but it can influence their 
behavior and alter their sense of identity and personhood. This violates moral 
 
42 Tamara Denning, Yoky Matsuoka & Tadayoshi Kohno, Neurosecurity: 
security and privacy for neural devices, 27 NEUROSURGICAL FOCUS E7 (2009). 
43 QianQian Li, Ding Ding & Mauro Conti, Brain-Computer Interface 
Applications: Security and Privacy Challenges, in 2015 IEEE CONFERENCE ON 
COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORK SECURITY 663-66 (2015). 
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values of autonomy, free will, and self-determination. They call for further 
suggestions as to the appropriate legal safeguards ought to be established.44 
Now, as seen, there are a few peculiarities that BCIs bring to the legal 
arena. But all in all, these peculiarities can be addressed by employing 
suitable mechanisms that would enable us to apply the law equally. This is 
almost a technical matter. Then, what is the central problem that arises from 
BCIs? It is the fact that we are facing a new era that will bring about new 
threats to fundamental freedoms.  
C. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
The privilege against self-incrimination is a legal principle that 
prohibits governments from compelling individuals to witness against 
themselves involuntarily or to furnish evidence that implicates their 
involvement in a crime. The privilege against self-incrimination protects 
suspects from the ‘cruel trilemma’ of having to choose between self-
accusation, contempt of court, and perjury. In the United States, the privilege 
is outlined in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, stating that no 
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”45 In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment does prevent the government from compelling a suspect to 
provide testimonial evidence such as communicative and verbal statements; 
however, it does not prevent the government from compelling a suspect to 
provide physical evidence such as blood.46 The rationale to the distinction 
between physical and testimonial evidence Schmerber created was that the 
Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort 
communication from suspects, not an exclusion of their body as evidence 
because the former puts a person in ‘the cruel trilemma’ whereas the latter 
does not.47 Interestingly, as Stoller and Wolpe have recognized, emerging 
neuro-technologies make a hybrid form of evidence. On the one hand, they 
extract information directly from the brain that indicates, e.g., whether a 
person is lying or recognizing an object concerning a crime, which is 
 
44 Marcello Ienca & Pim Haselager, Hacking the Brain: Brain–Computer 
Interfacing Technology and the Ethics of Neurosecurity, 18 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 
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45 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
46 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
47 Matthew Baptiste Holloway, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating 
Words: Images of Brain Activity and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination 
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testimonial in nature; but on the other hand, they are available in the form of 
a physical object, e.g., a brainwave or a flow of blood, without requiring a 
verbal response.48 Thus, neuroscientific evidence does not fit the existing 
dichotomic framework of testimonial/physical evidence about the privilege 
against self-incrimination.49   
The complimentary Fourth Amendment, which protects “the right of 
people to secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,”50 also raises issues of privacy and 
criminal procedures in varying degrees to different categories of individuals 
– suspects, key eyewitnesses, and general members of the population.51 As 
for suspects, some argue that there is a high expectation of privacy for brain 
activity.52 In contrast, others maintain that the low intrusiveness of non-
invasive BCIs might overcome this expectation.53 As for critical 
eyewitnesses, Laura Klaming & Anton Vedder discuss the possibility of 
improving eyewitness memory using neuro-technologies. However, using 
such methods entails a risk of planting misinformation.54 In particular, 
Haushaleter refers to eyewitnesses who suffered traumatic brain injury either 
due to the crime being investigated or otherwise, and allowing them to 
participate in criminal investigation and “testify” in a trial using BCIs.55  
D. Evidence 
Brain-based lie detection could potentially be relevant for a wide 
variety of issues, e.g., to substantiate if one was at the scene of a crime, 
evaluate subjective pain, support eyewitness testimony, predict future 
 
48 Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie 
Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 359–75 (2007). 
49 Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351–408 (2012). 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
51  Amanda C. Pustilnik, Neurotechnologies at the Intersection of Criminal 
Procedure and Constitutional Law, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 109–34 (John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 
2013). 
52 Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law Privacy, 
Security, and Human Dignity in the Digital Age, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653–
714 (2013). 
53 Pustilnik, supra note 53. 
54 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year 
investigation of the malleability of memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY 361–66 
(2005). 
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behavior at parole hearings, and to consider mental states at sentencing. 
There are two prominent techniques for brain-based evidence: EEG measures 
electrical activity in the brain, and fMRI detects changes in hemodynamic; 
both depend on various factors, including the experimental design, proper 
implementation of the design, and proper interpretation of the results. 56 In 
using brain scans as evidence, a few issues arise.   
BRAIN SCANS. As non-invasive brain imaging techniques have been 
rapidly improving in detecting brain activity, attorneys proffer brain scans as 
evidence to civil and criminal courts. The legal system is not only interested 
in how people act (actus reus) but also in what they were thinking or capable 
of thinking when they acted (mens rea).  
Owen D. Jones et al. outline concerns relating to neuroscientific 
testimony, including varying scientific certainty standards, the use of jargon, 
problems in the translation of neuroscientific evidence, and the use of group 
averaged data applied to an individual.57 Teneille Brown and Emily Murphy 
provide a comprehensive analysis of fMRI use in legal contexts, arguing that 
given the status, capabilities, and constraints of currently used fMRI 
technologies and techniques, such images should not be admitted into 
evidence to prove or rebut criminal mens rea charges.58 Emily Baron and 
Jacqueline Sullivan approach the topic from the perspective of the 
philosophy of the social, cognitive, and behavioral sciences. They explain 
that current criteria for evaluating brain evidence to determine its 
admissibility in legal contexts are inadequate, contending that a more 
detailed evaluation of the research studies on which such evidence is based 
is needed to ensure its effectiveness in legal contexts.59 Shats, Brindles & 
Giordano contend that neuroscientific evidence must first be scrutinized 
more heavily for its relevance, to ensure that the right question is asked of 
neuroscientists, to enable expert interpretation of neuroscientific evidence 
 
56 Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, 
Lies, and Lessons The Brain Sciences in the Courtroom, 62 MERCER L. REV. 861–
84 (2011). 
57 Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in court, 14 NATURE REVIEWS 
NEUROSCIENCE 730–36 (2013). 
58 Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional 
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within the limits of their field of expertise that allows the judge or jury to 
determine the facts in the case.60 
LIE DETECTION. Shen and Owens explore a particular context of 
law and neuroscience, the use of brain scans as evidence of lying or truth-
telling, and illustrate the use of those scans by the landmark 2010 federal 
criminal trial United States v. Semrau.61 That case involved the first federal 
hearing regarding the admissibility of testimony about brain scans submitted 
as evidence of a person lying or telling the truth. They identify five topics 
pertinent to future encounters between courts and brain scanning evidence: 
experimental design, ecological and external validity, ensuring subject 
compliance with researcher instructions, false memories, and making 
individual inferences from group data. If scientific progress is sufficient, 
someday brain scan evidence will be admissible in new legal contexts. But, 
in the case of lie detection — not yet.62 
ERP AND BEOS. An Event-Related Potential (ERP) is a measured 
brain response that directly results from a specific sensory, cognitive, or 
motor event. Electroencephalography (EEG) measures ERP.63 Scholars have 
suggested using ERPs in a forensic investigation as part of the various 
techniques used to solve crimes such as fingerprints and DNA. The concept 
of using a BCI as a forensic tool requires that a suspect take a guilty 
knowledge test (GKT) that contains information related to the crime while a 
specialist is recording an EEG signal. Then signal analysis is applied to the 
recorded electric signal to determine if the crime-related information was of 
significance to the suspect or not. If the information is proven significant, 
then the suspect is classified as guilty.64 A variant of ERP is the Brain 
Electrical Oscillation Signature Profiling (BEOS), which individuals 
experience participating in a crime. The technique was developed in 2003 in 
India. Currently, investigators use BEOS as a forensic tool in investigation, 
 
60 Katherine Shats, Timothy Brindley & James Giordano, Don’t Ask a 
Neuroscientist about Phases of the Moon: Applying Appropriate Evidence Law to 
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62 Shen & Jones, supra note 58. 
63 STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL 
TECHNIQUE (2005). 
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I.344 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y [Vol. XV No. 1 
 
and attorneys use BEOS as corroborative evidence in criminal trials.65 This 
technology raises disturbing questions concerning criminal procedure, 
evidence, and the rights of criminal suspects. 
E. Privacy 
While BCI-applications are developed to improve the quality of life, 
providing access to a user’s brain signals, and the features extracted from 
them, they can seriously violate the user’s privacy.66 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
protects the right to privacy. It states, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks 
upon his honor and reputation.”67 Similarly, Article 8 of the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates that “everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence.”68 
The right to privacy was first defined in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren and Louis 
D. Brandeis as “the right to be alone.”69 Judge Posner perceives privacy as 
composed of two different interests. One is the interest in being left alone, 
and the other is the right of an individual “to conceal discreditable facts about 
himself.”70 In Europe, the right to privacy recently gained recognition with 
the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), primarily aimed at 
giving individuals control over their data considering multinational 
corporations’ common practice — especially in media and communication 
— to collect and process users’ data for monetary profit.71 The question is: 
does the current privacy protection regime apply to mental data as well? 
When the UDHR was adopted in 1948, the future challenges of BCIs 
and artificial intelligence could not even be imagined. And so, there are no 
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provisions in the UDHR to tackle new threats created by technological 
advances. Rights that were once taken for granted are now exposed to 
possible violations.  
One of the most worrisome dystopian scenarios about BCIs relates 
to their use by the state (and other asymmetric powerful entities like the 
military and employers). In China, government-backed surveillance projects 
deploy brain-reading technology to detect emotional state changes in 
employees on the production line and drivers of high-speed trains.72, 73 In the 
U.S., legal scholars analyzed  and debated whether the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments provide sufficient protection of mental privacy.74 E.g., 
Farahany argued that “mental privacy is not sacrosanct under either the 
Fourth or Fifth Amendment, which provides procedural safeguards but not 
substantive ones to protect mental privacy adequately.”75 In a Nature Review 
Neuroscience article, the authors maintained that it should be possible to 
decode mental states from brain activity — at least in principle — as accuracy 
and efficiency remain unclear due to such a decoding process’ inferential 
character.76 Indeed, with the use of artificial intelligence algorithms, science 
has progressed exponentially in decoding mental states from brain activity. 
However, it might exacerbate the problem of biases in forensics when applied 
to criminal justice.77  
Since Warren and Brandeis declared a “right to privacy,” U.S. court 
rulings have established privacy rights by referring to precedent in the Bill of 
Rights, such as the Fourth Amendment right to privacy from Katz v. United 
States.78 However, these kinds of interpretations do not apply in the 
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commercial realm.79 Facebook is currently developing wearable EEG-based 
BCIs that read and interpret users’ thoughts, emotions, and intentions to 
provide hands-free communication without saying a word to its platform. 
This information could enable us to make inferences regarding a user’s 
memory, emotional reactions, and conscious and unconscious interests. 
When putting this technology into practice, Facebook will gain access to read 
the neural and mental activity of millions of users and will be able to detect 
brain signals whenever a user’s brain responds to something worth noting. 
Thus, Facebook will study user’s preferences and identify political views, 
religious views, and sexual orientations—even before the user herself is 
conscious about it (in addition to the company’s already enormous databases 
on users). It would still be able to sell the user’s data to third parties. 
However, neural data differs from mental data, or in the words of 
neuroscientist Read Montague, “[y]our mind is not equal to your brain and 
the interaction of its parts, but your mind is equivalent to the information 
processing, the computations, supported by your brain.”80 Concerning this 
data, Bublitz suggests a brain-mind distinction for normative purposes that 
subjects different properties to different regulatory regimes. Through the lens 
of data protection, both brain data and mental data can link to individual 
persons; hence, it constitutes personal data protected by the EU’s GDPR. 
Both can be regarded as ‘personally identifiable information’ and receive 
protection in the US because there is a reasonable expectation of brain 
activity privacy. However, in the words of Nita Farahany, “there are no legal 
protections from having your mind involuntarily read.” This means that at 
present, no specific legal or technical safeguards protect brain data from 
being subject to datamining and privacy-intruding measures similar to other 
types of information. 
Some may argue that there is not much of a difference between the 
data that social media companies are now obtaining from their user, and 
analyzing for profit, and between the additional data BCIs will provide them. 
They would say that Facebook analyzes our every online move and makes 
inferences about our conscious and unconscious online behavior.81 But, there 
is a particular concern about neural signals. Each person has control over 
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their ability to overtly share information of mental states and voluntarily 
choose to either express or suppress information. These choices are variants 
of expressing or concealing neural information, and a BCI device should not 
violate this control. BCIs can violate a person’s agency and bypass her 
control over what she shares with the outside world. There is a privacy 
violation when the signals are obtained or analyzed for purposes not intended 
by the individual because they no longer maintain the ability to mediate their 
own information.82  
We have to live with the undesirable results of social media, and it is 
too late to go back. We do not want the same thing to happen with BCIs; they 
are so much more important because they are related to manipulating brain 
activity, which is the physical basis of the human mind. 
F. Private Law 
The most clear, significant, and immediate implications are related 
to criminal law issues and privacy issues, but they are not the only ones, such 
as intellectual property (IP) law. The academic literature paid little to no 
attention to IP from the perspective of neuro-technologies, even more so 
BCIs. The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution enables Congress to 
secure “to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”83 Copyright law protects original works of 
authorship expressed in any tangible medium such as literary, musical, 
graphic, architectural works, etc.84 It protects expression in works of 
authorship against copying, and it entails three basic requirements: (i) work 
of authorship, (ii) original, and (iii) fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.85 The novelty of BCIs in the context of proprietary rights stems 
from our recently acquired ability to express brain waves via tangible 
mediums. NeuroSky is a manufacturer of BCI technologies for commercial 
and recreational use. One of the applications the company offers is Braintone 
Art, an EEG-based algorithm (Braintone Art Imagery Generation Engine) 
that enables to projection of users’ emotions as abstract art on a digital canvas 
using nothing but brainwaves. The company markets this app (and its 
supplementary EEG headset) as “EEG art” and a new visual way to express 
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creativity.86 Lisa Park is an interdisciplinary artist who attempts to display 
human emotion and physiological changes in auditory presentations. She is 
using a commercial brainwave sensor (Emotiv EPOC) to musicalize 
brainwaves.87 Both visual and auditory examples satisfy the law’s three 
requirements: both works of authorship, both original, and both fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression. Nevertheless, they can be a topic for legal 
debate. A preliminary question is who owns and controls the raw neural data 
(EEG scans) obtained from using a consumer device? The relationship 
between neural data and BCI users and their control over their neural data is 
neither regulated nor standardized.88 Even if the user retains ownership of the 
raw neural data, it is still unclear who retains ownership over the finished 
artwork, which realization could not occur without the joint effort of both the 
artist’s brainwaves and the company’s (probably patent protected) algorithm. 
Another law field is tort. Tort law is the legal regime governing when 
entities or persons are civilly liable for harm befalling others and compensate 
the injured parties for damages. With the expansion of use in BCI devices for 
therapeutic, professional, and recreational purposes, users probably cause 
property damage and personal injuries due to limits in both controllability of 
BCIs using mental states and foreseeability of outcomes inherent in these 
devices, which the law will soon need to address.89 Contrary to the gap 
described in Section BCI-Mediated Action referring to the establishment of 
responsibility, in tort law, there is no requirement for a voluntary bodily 
movement, as the law defines an ‘act’ as “an external manifestation of the 
actor’s will.”90 Establishing civil liability deals with causation, duties of care, 
and negligence – inferred by evaluating the actions at hand compared with a 
hypothetical reasonable person's actions in the same situation. However, 
cases that involve BCI-mediated action will encompass unique scenarios and 
circumstances.91 For example, exoskeleton or prosthetics that harm their 
 
86 Beautiful Brainwaves: Creating EEG Art, NEUROSKY (Nov. 2011), 
http://neurosky.com/2015/11/beautiful-brainwaves-creating-eeg-art.  
87 Eunoia II, LISA PARK, (2014) https://www.thelisapark.com/work/eunoia2. 
88 Stephanie Naufel & Eran Klein, Brain–computer interface (BCI) researcher 
perspectives on neural data ownership and privacy, 17 J. NEURAL ENG'G. (2020). 
89 Rainey, Maslen, & Savulescu, supra note 29. 
90 Andreas Kuersten, Legal Ramifications of Brain-Computer-Interface 
Technology, AJOB NEUROSCIENCE (2020), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21507740.2019.1704931 (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2020). 
91 Id. 
2021] Neurolaw: Brain-Computer Interfaces 349 
 
  
users, others, or property result from unanticipated subconscious thought.92 
In one experiment, to mitigate delay in a prosthetic limb's movement, 
researchers implanted a (non-AI) BCI into users’ posterior parietal cortex 
(PPC), an area associated with movement mapping and planning, and sub- or 
pre-conscious thought. The technology predicts and triggers actions before 
the user is consciously aware that she will make them.93 Another example is 
actions occurring in the convergence of artificial intelligence and BCI, where 
free will, autonomy, and agency arise. As a result, it may seem that no one 
bears liability.  
In trying to resolve the gaps, Rainey et al. propose distinguishing 
between “necessary” and “recreational” use of BCIs. Disabled people 
causing harm as a result of the necessary use of BCI should not be liable. 
After all, they could not act otherwise. In contrast, commercial users causing 
harm due to recreational use of BCI should be held liable because they had 
an alternative to acting otherwise when they decided to create the risk.94 
Bublitz et al. suggest that BCI users bear a specific duty to prevent harm to 
others that arise from operating the BCI and thus should be held by liability 
for omissions even if not initiated or controlled by them, or by way of 
imposing a strict liability regime.95 What seems to be agreed upon by all of 
the abovementioned scholars is that tort law cases relating to BCI would 
increase, and the legal framework should be updated to accommodate them. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. New Human Rights 
The rapid advancement in human neuroscience and neurotechnology 
open unparalleled possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing, and 
manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications challenge 
human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended 
consequences. Ienca and Andorno analyzed the relationship between 
neuroscience and human rights and identified four new human rights that will 
become of great relevance in the coming years: (i) the right to cognitive 
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liberty; (ii) the right to mental privacy; (iii) the right to mental integrity; (iv) 
and the right to psychological continuity.96  
THE RIGHT TO COGNITIVE LIBERTY. While thoughts had been 
considered inherently private in the past, neuro-technologies have changed 
the situation and may – in the future – lead users to develop meta-cognition.97 
Having their brains monitored, prospective BCI users might change their 
inner-life and limit the scope of their thoughts out of fear of exposer, which 
in turn would impact their personality and sense of identity, including 
cognitive capabilities, intelligence, and fantasies.98 In the age of 
technological intrusion into our minds, legal scholars resurrect the concept 
of freedom of thought by promoting the idea of “cognitive liberty,” defined 
by Sententia as a twenty-first century updated term for “freedom of thought,” 
which takes into account the power we now have — and increasingly will 
have — to monitor and manipulate cognitive function.99 The right to 
cognitive liberty aims at protecting our mental capacities from undesired 
influence. It comprises a negative dimension that protects freedom from 
interferences by the state and third parties, and a positive dimension that 
grants the freedom to self-determine one’s inner sphere, e.g., the content of 
a person’s thoughts, consciousness or any other mental phenomena.100 As 
Bublitz concisely put it, it is the legal principle that guarantees “the right to 
alter one’s mental states with the help of neuro tools as well as to refuse to 
do so.”101 
THE RIGHT TO MENTAL PRIVACY. The typology of Finn et al. 
acknowledges seven different types of privacy concerning protection of 
individuals against new and emerging technologies: privacy of the person; 
the privacy of behavior and action; privacy of personal communication; the 
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privacy of data and image; privacy of thoughts and feelings; privacy of 
location and space; privacy of association.  Frank Tong and Michael Pratte 
have argued mental privacy could face enormous new challenges, in both 
legal settings and beyond, as there has been no precedent for having the 
ability to look into the mind of another human being.102 Recent years have 
seen growing attention to the discussion on whether mental privacy should 
receive legal protection and in what context. There are many different ways 
in which acts may violate a person’s mental privacy:  
THE RIGHT TO MENTAL INTEGRITY. The right to personal physical 
and mental integrity is protected by Article Three of the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, stating that “everyone has the right to respect for his or 
her physical and mental integrity.”103 The separation between physical and 
mental health delineated in Article Three stems from Descartes’ philosophy 
of body-mind dualism that views the body and the mind as distinct and 
separable.  Moreover, almost every legal system has embedded this dualism, 
which led the law to systematically afford protection to bodies and brains, 
not minds and mental states. For instance, the E.U. Charter of Fundamental 
Rights considers mental integrity as the right to mental health from a 
psychiatric/psychological perspective.104 With the emergence of neuro-
technologies legal scholars are advocating for the law to protect the inner 
sphere of persons by broadening the scope of the right to mental integrity so 
that it would guarantee not only the right of individuals with cognitive 
conditions to access psychiatric treatment instead of additionally ensuring the 
right of individuals to protect their mental sphere from harm.  Bublitz has 
recognized two types of potential damage to the mental sphere: the infliction 
of mental injury — i.e., pain, disorder, impairment of mental health, and 
mental manipulation — i.e., influences on preferences and choices.105 Indeed, 
BCIs can bring about alterations of a person’s neural computation and 
perception of their identity. 
THE RIGHT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY. BCIs and other 
neuro-technologies may also cause unintended alterations in mental states 
that are crucial to personality and can affect an individual’s identity. This 
right should provide specific normative protection from potential 
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neurotechnology-enabled interventions involving the unauthorized 
modification of a person’s neural computation and harming the victim. 
Accordingly, a violation of this right is comprised of three elements: (i) direct 
access and manipulation of neural signaling; (ii) unauthorized; and (iii) result 
in physical or psychological harm. 
Combined, these novel human rights that have been put together, and 
suggested by Ienca and Andorno, aimed at assuring anyone could protect her 
identity from external influence and reject changes in her brain functions. 
Their purpose is to protect us from the possibility of abusing technology to 
manipulate our neural activity.106 While the guideline they propose is 
essential to the era of neuro-technologies, the law should further define what 
kinds of mental phenomena are worthy of protection by their mental 
properties
 
and introduce provisions penalizing interferences with mental 
integrity rather than expanding the protection of bodily integrity to mental 
integrity.107 
B. Chile 
In Chile, a commission designated to address the challenges of the 
future presented, last month, in front of the senate, two law projects that aim 
to protect people’s brain data and mental privacy in the face of BCI and 
artificial intelligence. The first is an amendment to the constitution that 
defines mental identity for the first time in history as a right that cannot be 
manipulated. It states that any intervention, even for health reasons, must be 
legally regulated.108 The second is a bill that includes fundamental 
revolutionary principles,109 that are based on the five principles defined by 
Columbia University’s NeuroRights Initiative:110 
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1. The first principle is the Right to Personal Identity. This 
principle states that boundaries must be developed to prohibit 
technology from disrupting the sense of self. When BCIs 
connect individuals with digital networks, it could blur the line 
between a person’s consciousness and external technological 
inputs. 
2. The second principle is the Right to Free-Will. This principle 
states that individuals should have ultimate control over their 
own decision making without unknown influence from external 
technologies.  
3. The third principle is the Right to Mental Privacy. This principle 
states that any data obtained from measuring neural activity 
(NeuroData) should be kept private. Moreover, the sale, 
commercial transfer, and use of neural data should be strictly 
regulated. 
4. The fourth principle is the Right to Equal Access to Mental 
Augmentation. This principle states that there should be 
established guidelines at both international and national levels 
regulating the development and applications of mental-
enhancement neuro-technologies. These guidelines should be 
based on the principle of justice and guarantee equality of access 
to all citizens. 
5. The fifth principle is the Right to Protection from Algorithmic 
Bias. This principle states that countermeasures to combat bias 
should be the norm for machine learning. Algorithm design 
should include input from user groups to address bias 
foundationally.  
If passed, Chile could turn into the first country that has a law that protects 
neurorights! 
C. Technocratic Oath 
But, if we genuinely want to protect our NeuroData, we must do so 
by dint of design. And to that end, the most current project is Professor Rafael 
Yuste’s “Technocratic Oath.” Professor Yuste is drafting an ethical 
framework for entrepreneurs, physicians, and researchers developing BCIs 
and artificial intelligence.111 Just like as doctors follow the Hippocratic Oath, 
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those who design and administer neurotechnology would follow the 
“technocratic oath.” 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The discussion shows that BCIs – uniquely integrated with artificial 
intelligence – entail complex legal matters. Naturally, the field of law that 
received the most attention thus far is constitutional law and human rights; it 
is central to the understating of legal theory and from which all other rights 
and privileges stem. The following field relative to the number of 
publications is criminal and procedural law and for a good reason. Both of 
these public law fields deal with providing individuals protections against the 
asymmetric and disproportional power of governments, which are of direct 
concern to the society.  
Access to the neural processes that underlie conscious thought 
entails access to a level of the self that cannot be consciously filtered.112 This 
risks violation of individual privacy and dignity, with the potential to 
suppress free will and breach the ultimate sanctuary of human freedom – the 
human mind. Personal identity, agency, and moral responsibility may be 
diminished by merging neurological and digital experiences. Such could 
change the nature of humanity and human societies unless we reform – not 
only our laws – but also our perspective on NeuroData and the protections it 
should receive.  
In a globalized world, where tech companies influence our lives 
unhindered, both at the individual and the societal level, linking the brain 
directly to digital networks could fundamentally change human societies and 
humanity. On October 22, 2020, the Council of Europe adopted resolution 
2344 (2020), where it called on its member states to develop specific legal 
frameworks that guarantee adequate respect and protection of individual 
rights and ensure appropriate bodies exist for the oversight of BCI-
technology to ensure effective implementation of the application 
frameworks.113 The Council of Europe stated there is an urgent need for 
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precautionary regulation now, and the legal community should respond to 
this call to action. 
